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DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY TO UNINCORPORATED 
NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONSt 
Harold A. ]. Ford* 
I N present-day society much stress is placed on the institutional and corporate, but it cannot be said that legal systems with a 
common law basis provide clear rules regulating all types of group 
activity in which an individual may engage. For two forms of 
group activity, the partnership and the incorporated group, the 
law is comparatively well established on distinctive lines but it has 
failed to provide a settled place for the unincorporated group not 
organized for profit. 
The term unincorporated non-profit association embraces an 
extensive range of groups. Within this range are wide variations: 
in terms of purpose, from the social club concerned simply with 
securing comfort and prestige for its members to the charitable 
association concerned also with benefits for non-members; in 
terms of impact upon society, from the small formally constituted 
dining club with little or no impact to the powerful trade union 
whose operations may have significant effects on a nation's econ-
omy. 
Traditionally, the common law has attempted to answer the 
legal problems raised by these groups by regarding them simply 
as aggregations of individuals and endeavoring to resolve any con-
troversy concerning them simply by reference to rules governing 
co-ownership, contract and agency. Any rules specially developed 
in regard to them are to be found in the interstices of law de-
veloped for individuals. At one time there were policy reasons 
why this should be so. Developments in England, discernible as 
early as the reign of Edward III, established that the capacity to 
act as a group in the legal system did not follow from the fact of 
being a group, but from a royal grant of the right to be a group.1 
This theory, the franchise theory, which assisted the assertion and 
maintenance of royal power, produced the common law rule that 
where a society which had not been incorporated presumed to act 
as a corporation the members would be guilty of a contempt of the 
t This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed. 
• Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Melboume;-LL.B. 1948, LL.M. 1949, University 
of Melboume.-Ed. 
1 GOEBEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 583-610 (1937). 
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monarch, inasmuch as they had usurped his prerogative.2 In such 
a climate of thought the royal courts would not be disposed to 
develop legal techniques to assist the unincorporated groups in the 
matter of holding property and other matters. 
In 1802 Lord Eldon thought "it singular that this Court should 
sit upon the concerns of an association, which in law has no exist-
ence ... .''3 His refusal to give legal significance to the fact that an 
association existed for a continuing group enterprise was due to an 
apprehension that by so doing he would be recognizing as a legal 
unit something which was neither a natural person nor an artificial 
person. The category of artificial persons was closed by reason of 
the policy which regarded group existence in law as a privilege to 
be obtained only by grant from the monarch. 
The political reasons for courts abstaining from giving legal 
significance to the fact of association in unincorporated groups have 
waned. That courts now give legal significance to that fact is borne 
out by their decisions in a number of situ3:tions. The definition 
of the rights of individual associates in the association property 
upon which courts have embarked is based on a recognition that 
membership of a definite group has legal consequences.4 Decisions 
which recognize that formation of an association creates a new 
purpose to which property may be devoted by something akin to 
a purpose trust point in the same way/5 In the field of remedies for 
wrongful expulsion from associations the notion that the court in 
giving such remedies is merely enforcing a contract or protecting 
the property rights of an individual is rendered less plausible as 
the courts readily imply contracts or expand the concept of prop-
erty specially for this purpose. 
Despite these developments which should accustom courts to 
doing what Lord Eldon thought singular, modern courts some-
times refuse to recognize that an unincorporated association may 
be legally significant on the ground that it is not a legal person 
either natural or artificial. They have thought that by treating it 
as significant in law they would be improperly adding to a category 
2 R. v. Webb, 14 East. 406, 104 Eng. Rep. 658 (1811); Duvergier v. Fellows, 5 Bing. 
248 at 268, 130 Eng. Rep. 105.6 (1828); Blundell v. Windsor, 8 Sim. 601 at 613, 59 Eng. Rep. 
238 (1837). 
s Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. Jr. 773 at 778, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1802). Members of a 
lodge of Freemasons who sued to recover certain goods of the society almost had their bill 
dismissed because it went too far in disclosing their corporate character. Lord Eldon, 
however, relented and allowed them to amend their bill so that it would show that they 
were suing as individuals on behalf of a number of individuals with a joint interest. 
4 Pages 73-75 infra. 
Ii Text beginning at note 83 infra [to be published subsequently-Ed.]. 
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which in their view is closed. A legal system by its very nature 
requires units upon which it can bring its influence to bear in the 
business of regulating relations. These units have often been called 
legal persons. The expression is not a happy one. It is capable of 
conveying the impression that the only real legal unit is the human 
being and that all other legal units are artificial. In truth, all legal 
units, including human beings, are artificial. Law being an instru-
ment of social regulation it very often has human beings as its units 
but there may be occasions when the legal system must determine 
that something which is not a human being is a legal unit. Oft-
quoted examples of this are ships and idols.6 When human beings 
act in concert and the legal system approves the group enterprise 
to the extent of being prepared to provide facilities for its fulfill-
ment it may, for the more effective provision of these facilities, find 
it convenient to bracket the collection of individuals behind a 
smaller unit. Here a mere abstraction, the idea of an entity arising 
from the association, is treated as a unit. As has been often re-
marked, the narrowness of the range of purposes for which some 
human beings, such as slaves and persons civilly dead, have been 
regarded as legally significant, points to the notion that a legal 
system can conc~ivably refuse to recognize a human being as a legal 
person or unit of the legal system. 
To assert that legal personality is not primarily predicated upon 
human personality does not involve denial of the proposition that 
law is primarily concerned with regulating the affairs of human 
beings. The selection of legal units which are not human beings 
is simply part of a technique whereby that end may be attained. 
Legal systems are theoretically free to ascribe significance as legal 
units to things or ideas as required. 
For a long time the franchise theory of corporate personality 
restricted this freedom in Anglo-American law. Changes in the 
procedure for obtaining incorporation such as those made in Eng-
land in the nineteenth century reflect the disappearance of the 
political reasons for this restriction and render the franchise notion 
an inadequate basis for failure to give unincorporated associations 
facilities in the law adapted to their needs. Incorporation is now 
a formal administrative process in which there is so little discretion 
that it appears to be more a right than a privilege.7 
6 Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, L.R. 52 Indian App. (P.C.) 
245 (1925). 
7 PATON, JURISPRUDENCE, 2d ed., 334-335 (1951). 
70 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
A question may be raised as to whether any attempt to improve 
the facilities of the legal system for unincorporated associations 
should be made in view of the existence of a policy that all groups 
should be encouraged to become incorporated. A legal system 
which was concerned with its own smooth working as a primary 
aim might carry such a policy to the extent of neglecting unincor-
porated associations altogether. But ease of operation cannot be 
the primary aim of the legal system. The complexity of modern 
business is such that incorporation must involve state registration 
in the interests of certainty. To require all groups to register be-
fore obtaining any facilities from the legal system might be re-
garded as so authoritarian as to be unacceptable to all but a few 
political philosophies. The decisions of the courts indicate that 
this harsh view is not taken and that unincorporated group life is 
recognized as a normal facet of modem society. To attempt to find 
ways of improving the facilities given by the legal system to unin-
corporated associations is not necessarily to attempt to give them 
all the advantages of incorporation. Too often courts have been 
willing to assist unincorporated associations without appearing to 
want to do so. They have often assisted them under the pretense 
of assisting individuals. This has led to uncertainty and needless 
inconsistencies. The aim of this article is to examine the ways in 
which courts in common law countries have given this assistance 
and the problems they have encountered in regard to property 
transactions. 
The simplest method of devoting property to an association 
from the point of view of the donor is to give the property to trus-
tees to hold upon trust for the existing members of the association. 
Such a trust is for beneficiaries who are certain and it will not 
offend any aspect of the law concerning perpetuities if its com-
mencement is not unduly delayed. From the point of view of the 
association, however, such a disposition vests the equitable interest 
in the existing members only and changes in membership will need 
to be supported by assignments. As will be seen later the incidents 
of equitable co-ownership as associates which the courts have 
worked out differ from those which attach to beneficiaries of a 
trust who are otherwise unassociated. Whether this difference in 
incidents is so great as to prevent a trust for the existing members 
from really being a trust for individuals will be one aspect of this 
article's theme. It is sufficient at this stage to say that English con-
veyancers for a very long time have been content to vest property 
in associations and devote it to the purposes of a corporate group 
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by an instrument which is ostensibly one benefiting a class of 
ascertainable individuals and the courts have been prepared to 
uphold those instruments on that basis. 
Benefactors of associations, however, do not intend to confer 
benefits on the existing members but on the group-purpose and if 
in disposing instruments they make this intention manifest by 
making the gift directly to the association in its name or in trust 
for the association in its name, difficult problems arise. 
So far as dispositions of this kind inter vivas are concerned 
courts in the British Commonwealth do not appear to be faced 
with them very often. On the other hand, in American case law 
there are numerous instances of litigation arising out of attempted 
conveyances of property inter vivas to unincorporated groups in 
the group name. The reason for this disparity is not readily ap-
parent. Although the British lawyer may have exercised circum-
spection in regard to dispositions inter vivas there are many in-
stances of testamentary dispositions in which an attempt has been 
made to devise or bequeath property directly or in trust for the 
benefit of an association eo nomine and litigation has resulted; 
these cases are found in British as well as American courts. 
J. DISPOSITIONS OF INTERESTS INTER VIVOS TO AN AssocIATION 
Eo NOMINE 
A. Interests in Realty 
Some American courts have said that a deed of conveyance of a 
legal interest in freehold land in which an association as such is 
named as the grantee is a nullity.8 One reason often given is that 
an association is not a legal person, natural or artificial, and is thus 
not a capable grantee.9 
When this reason is given it is premised on the view that the 
grantor intended to benefit the group enterprise as a continuing 
entity separate and distinct from the individuals who happen to 
be the members at the time the deed is delivered. In most cases 
this will be a correct assumption as to the intent of the grantor 
although it is conceivable that a person might want to make a grant 
to individuals as a class defined by reference to their being volun-
s Lael v. Crook, 192 Ark. 1115, 97 S.W. (2d) 436 (1936); Britton v. Jackson, 31 Ariz. 
97, 250 P. 763 (1926); Miller Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 65 Mo. App. 435 (1896); Jackson ex 
dem. Cooper v. Cory, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 385 (1811), Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 
73 (1812); Meiselbach v. Banner, 72 N.Y.S. (2d) 732 (1947); Heiligenstein v. Schlotterbeck, 
300 Ill. 206, 133 N.E. 188 (1921); Hawk v. Hawk, 88 Pa. Super. 581 (1926). 
9 See, e.g., Lael v. Crook, 192 Ark. 1115, 97 S.W. (2d) 436 (1936). 
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tarily associated under some association name. In any event, courts 
when confronted with a disposition to an association in such terms 
that it is doubtful whether the grantor intended a disposition to 
the continuing group enterprise or a class gift to the members at 
the time of the grant would nowadays be justified in presuming 
that the grantor had the former intent. By so doing they would 
acknowledge that laymen look on many associations as entities. 
Given that the grantor's intent was to confer a benefit on a continu-
ing group enterprise, that intent is regarded as incapable of effec-
tuation by vesting a legal title in the group eo nomine unless the 
group is incorporated. 
Sometimes the grant is held to be ineffective because the grantee 
is said to be uncertain. In some cases so holding10 reliance is placed 
on a statement in Coke on Littleton, "So a community not incor-
porated cannot purchase; as, the parishioners, or inhabitants of 
Dale."11 Although the description "inhabitants of Dale" would 
be uncertain in the sense that even if only those persons who were 
inhabitants at the time of the grant were intended to benefit, they 
might not be ascertainable, it seems probable that Coke here was 
not concerned with uncertainty so much as the absence of incorpo-
ration. This statement would be appropriate authority for those 
cases in which the deed has been held void for failure to name as 
grantee a legal person, when the grantor's intent is taken to be one 
to benefit a continuing group enterprise as an entity. But it would 
not conclude the issue when the court is prepared to assume that 
the grantor intended to benefit those individuals who were mem-
bers at the time of the delivery of the deed. The question whether 
the description of the class as members of a certain association 
would be sufficient would remain open. 
There would be the possibility that membership of a particular 
group might be so well defined that there would be no more diffi-
culty in ascertaining the individual grantees than in ascertaining 
the grantees under a grant to all the children of J.S. The state-
ment from Coke on Littleton, however, was given a wider opera-
tion when it was incorporated in the treatment of grants in Shep-
pard's Touchstone.12 There, after illustrative statements that 
grants to all the sons, or to all the ·daughters, or to all the children, 
10 See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 73 (1812). Deed of conveyance of 
land subject to proviso in favor of the inhabitants of an unincorporated town. Proviso 
held void. 
11 Co. Lm. •Sa. 
12 Pages •235, •236, •237. 
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or to all the issue of J.S., or to the next of blood of J.S., would con-
tain descriptions of the grantees which would be certain enough, 
it is said that grants "to the parishioners or inhabitants of Dale, or 
to the good men of Dale ... " would be bad for uncertainty. This 
passage has been relied on so as to have the effect of preventing a 
grant to a group in the nature of an association regardless of 
whether the members were easily ascertainable. 
In a Missouri case of 1856,l3 a conveyance of real estate to a 
partnership in which the grantee was described as "W. W. Phelps 
& Co." was held to transfer the legal title to W. W. Phelps only. 
The court stated that the objection to the description of the grantee 
did not turn on whether it was possible to ascertain the members 
of the partnership. The effect of the reasoning in this case is that 
a grant to an association eo nomine is to be deemed uncertain as 
to the grantee as a matter of law so that the members cannot even 
claim to take individually under the group name. On the other 
hand, some courts have been prepared to allow that such a grant 
may operate as a grant of an estate to the individuals who made up 
the association at the date the deed operated.14 This treatment of 
a grant to an association eo nomine appears at first sight to give 
the grant an operation which the grantor in many cases would not 
intend; he usually intends to benefit the continuing group enter-
prise rather than those individuals who are members at a particu-
lar time. The ruling viewed in isolation appears to give the indi-
vidual members interests in the property which would permit them 
to seek partition and thus withdraw the property from the group 
enterprise. This type of decision, however, has to be seen in the 
light of the authorities dealing with the nature of the interest en-
joyed by each individual member in specific property of the asso-
ciation. 
From these authorities,15 it appears that that interest includes 
the right to enjoy the property jointly with all other members in 
accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the association but 
13 Arthur v. Weston, 22 Mo. 378 (1856). 
14 Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31, 2 N.E. 687 (1885); The Golden Rod, (D.C. Me. 
1912) 197 F. 830; Popovich v. Yugoslav National Home Soc., Inc., 106 Ind. App. 195, 18 
N.E. (2d) 948 (1939). 
15 McMahon v. Rauhr, 47 N.Y .. 67 (1871); Harris ex rel. Carpenters Union No. 2573, 
Oregon Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Backman, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P. (2d) 456 (1939); 
South Shore Country Club v. People, 228 111. 75, 81 N.E. 805 (1907); Re St. James's Club, 
2 De G.M. 8c: G. 383, 42 Eng. Rep. 920 (1852); Seeton v. Merchants' Bank, 18 N.S.R. 113, 
6 C.L.T. 442 (1885); Re Producers' Defence Fund, [1954] Viet. L.R. 246, [1954] Arg. L.R. 
541. 
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does not include any right to claim a separate share of that prop-
erty otherwise than on dissolution of the association with the ac-
quiescence of all other members or a majority required by the 
constitution for the time being. It does not include the right to 
assign the member's interest in specific association property other-
wise than in the course of an assignment of the interests of all 
members in the same property. Generally, on his ceasing to be a 
member by death, resignation, valid expulsion or other_ cause, he 
loses his interest in the association property. The ownership of 
property by associates thus appears to be a special form of co-own-
ership with incidents different from those of joint tenancy or 
tenancy in common. Whether this type of co-ownership is a new 
form which the courts have developed or whether it is the result 
of contractual variation of the incidents of well established forms 
of co-ownership is debatable. The contention that it is the latter 
may be supported by the many cases16 which proceed on the basis 
that the members of a voluntary association are in a contractual 
relationship inter se which is evidenced by the constitution and 
by-laws. A contention that it cannot be the latter may be urged 
on two bases. First, if there is a contract, the nature of the interest 
in association property which each member enjoys is very rarely 
spelled out in any contract document with the result that the court 
fixes the incidents under the guise of implying terms; secondly, 
although it has never been suggested that a minor cannot be a 
member of an association, the bearing of the principle that a 
minor has limited contractual capacity does not seem to have been 
considered. If, on the other hand, the true position is that the 
courts have developed a new form of co-ownership by associates, it 
can hardly be a common law form of co-ownership, at least where 
land is involved. The rules governing the transfer of legal in-
terests in land inter vivos provide one reason why this could not be 
so. Generally those rules require the transfer to be evidenced by 
a deed executed and delivered by the grantor or at least some writ-
ten manifestation of intention to transfer. The form of co-owner-
16 Brown v. Stoerkel, 74 Mich. 269, 41 N.W. 921 (1889); Harris ex rel. Carpenters 
Union No. 2573, Oregon Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Backman, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P. 
(2d) 456 (1939); Winnetka Trust &: Savings Bank v. Practical Refrigerating Engineers 
Assn., 322 Ill. App. 154, 54 N.E. (2d) 253 (1944); Seslar v. Local Union 901, Inc., (D.C. 
Ind. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 447; Thadeus Kosciuszko Soc. v. Polish Home Assn., (Mo. App. 
1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 8ll; Blenko v. Schmeltz, 362 Pa. 365, 67 A. (2d) 99 (1949); Harrington 
v. Sendall, [1903] I Ch. 921; Re Smith, [1914] I Ch. 937; Stephen v. Stewart, (1943] 3 
W.W.R. 580, 59 B.C.R. 410, [1944] I D.L.R. 305; Re Cain, [1950] Viet. L.R. 382, [1950] 
Arg. L.R. 796. 
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ship by associates contemplates that cessation of membership by 
resignation would be sufficient to deprive an associate of his inter-
est without a deed or other written instrument. Thus any form of 
co-ownership by associates must be equitable and those in whom 
the legal title to land is vested must hold on a trust for the group 
enterprise, the terms of which include the incidents of enjoyment 
of each member mentioned above. This trust must be the result 
of equities arising from the agreement to associate or, if it is true 
that the relation between members of an association is not always 
contractual, it must be the result of the courts recognizing the fact 
of association as having some legal significance of its own force. 
Whatever the theoretical basis for the special incidents of own-
ership by associates may be, those incidents are such as to suggest 
that a member who takes an individual interest under a grant to 
the association eo nomine is restrained, at least in equity, from 
claiming his share in severalty. This shows that the construction 
of a grant to the association eo nomine as a grant to the existing 
individual members is really a type of salvage operation by which 
courts, recognizing that grantors may wish to benefit group enter-
prises, do the best they can in the face of a supposed general prin-
ciple which looks on incorporated groups as the only continuing 
group enterprises which can take legal title to property directly. 
When, therefore, a grant is made to the X association some 
courts may treat it as a grant to A, B, C, and D who are all the 
members at the time the deed takes effect. At common law they 
must take by one of the recognized forms of co-ownership, either 
joint tenancy or tenancy in common. One might expect that they 
would take as joint tenants so as to take advantage of the doctrine 
of survivorship which would be more appropriate to property 
holding where an association is involved. The capacity of the legal 
title for becoming identified with persons outside the association 
on the death of any of these members would be lessened.17 But 
whether the members take as joint tenants or as tenants in common 
a rule which treats a deed of conveyance in which an association is 
named as grantee as conveying legal interests to the individual 
17 When discussing the possibility of this type of construction of a devise to an asso-
ciation in Stewart v. Green, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 470 (1870), Christian, L.J., assumed that the 
members would take as joint tenants. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held 
in Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31, 2 N.E. 687 (1885), that the members took as tenants in 
common. The terms of the grant did not include words of severance. The explanation 
lies in the Massachusetts statute first passed in 1785 by which dispositions of land to two 
or more persons create tenancies in common unless a contrary intent is shown. See now 
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 184, §7. 
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members runs counter to the policy aimed at procuring certainty 
of land titles. Such a rule would permit the individual grantees 
to be ascertained by a fact of independent significance, their mem-
bership of the association, but it would be a fact which is not nec-
essarily disclosed by public records readily available for inspection 
by prospective purchasers. It is in this respect that a grant to "the 
X association" differs from a grant to "the children of A." It is the 
degree of difficulty involved in ascertaining the individuals covered 
by the deed's description of the grantees rather than the likelihood 
of success in that search which should make such grants ineffec-
tive.18 
The result_ of this discussion would seem to be that the policy 
underlying the very formal techniques of conveying legal interests 
in land inter vivos prevents such grants from being effective rather 
than the fact that the association named as grantee is not a legal 
person. 
A somewhat similar problem is posed by a deed of conveyance 
to a partnership in which the partnership name is used to describe 
the grantee. Since the partnership name does not refer to a legal 
person the courts might have held such a deed to be a nullity as 
many have done when considering grants to an association eo 
nomine, but usually they have avoided this result.19 
18 Arthur v. Weston, 22 Mo. 378 (1856). 
19 In the United States, many states have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act which 
permits a partnership to acquire land in the partnership name and to grant land by a 
deed in which the partnership is named as grantor. Uniform Partnership Act §§8 (3), 10. 
To January 1, 1954, the Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in thirty-one states 
since the earliest adoptions in 1915. But decisions on the effect of deeds of conveyance to 
partnerships in the absence of that statute are instructive in this context. A deed of con-
veyance to a partnership in the firm name has been given effect by American courts in a 
variety of ways. One method adopted in early cases was to deny that the deed transferred 
a legal title but to hold that the deed constituted the grantor a trustee for the partner-
ship. [Tidd v. Rines, 26 Minn. 201, 2 N.W. 497 (1879)]. This method satisfies the policy 
aimed at securing certainty of land titles in favor of prospective purchasers by making use 
of the trust concept to bring into operation the doctrine of destructibility of outstanding 
equitable interests by conveyance of the legal title to a bona fide purchaser for value while 
at the same time giving the partners some interest by virtue of the deed. Another method 
is to hold that the deed vests the legal title in those persons who are members of the 
firm at the time of the grant, parol evidence being permitted to identify the members. 
Blanchard v. Floyd, 93 Ala. 53, 9 S. 418 (1890); Woodward v. McAdam, 101 Cal. 438, 35 
P. 1016 (1894); LaFayette Land Co. v. Caswell, 59 Fla. 544, 52 S. 140 (1910); Kentucky 
Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, (6th Cir. 1918) 249 F. 840. This has been done even 
when the firm name included no surname of any partner. Kelley v. Bourne, 15 Ore. 476, 
16 P. 40 (1887). Some courts have refused to adopt this approach holding that to allow 
a conveyance of real property to rest partly in parol would produce indefiniteness which 
would confuse land titles to an unjustifiable extent. Gille v. Hunt, 35 Minn. 357, 29 N.W. 
2 (1886); Barnett v. Lachman, 12 Nev. 361 (1877). Sometimes it has been held that where 
a partnership name contains the surname of one or more, but not all, of the partners, 
followed by words such as "and Company," "and Sons" or "and Bros.," the deed of con-
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B. Interests in Personalty 
The difficulties felt in connection with grants of interests in 
realty to associations are apparently not felt with regard to all 
kinds of personalty. Money and chattels raise no problem. No 
case denies that when a member pays his subscription, the disposi-
tion of property involved is effective. Many decisions assume that 
an association may own chattels.20 These decisions imply that the 
transaction by which the association acquired the property was 
effective even though an unincorporated group was the recipient. 
The comparative ease with which ownership of money and chattels 
may be transferred probably explains the absence of cases dealing 
with disposition of these types of property to associations inter 
VIVOS. 
Where personalty is of the kind for which it is necessary to have 
a register in order to assist determination of ownership the position 
would seem to be different. Registered securities would appear to 
be similar to realty and it might be expected that they could not 
veyance to the partnership in the firm name vests the legal title in the partner or partners 
whose names so appear, in trust for the partnership. Percifull v. Platt, 36 Ark. 456 (1880); 
Winter v. Stock, 29 Cal. 407, 89 Am. Dec. 57 (1866); Arthur v. Weston, 22 Mo. 378 (1856); 
Holmes v. Jarrett, 7 Heisk. (54 Tenn.) 506 (1872). In England, in Wray v. Wray, [1905] 
2 Ch. 349, a very liberal view was taken of a deed of conveyance to a partnership in which 
the grantee was described as "William Wray." At the time of the conveyance, the part-
nership conducted business under the name of "William Wray" but no member of the firm 
bore that name. Warrington, J., held that parol evidence was admissible to prove the 
names of the persons who were members and he treated the deed as conveying the legal 
title to them as joint tenants. Cf. Re Smith, [1914] 1 Ch. 937. In so doing he followed 
Maugham v. Sharpe, 17 C.B. (n.s.) 463, 144 Eng. Rep. 179 (1864), which, however, was 
concerned with a bill of sale conveying personalty. The peculiar difficulties arising from 
the need for certainty of land titles were not adverted to. In some British Commonwealth 
jurisdictions there is legislation requiring persons who trade under a name other than 
their own to register that name together with the names of the persons so trading, in a 
public register. Registration of Business Names Act, 1916, 6 8: 7 Geo. 5, c. 58, §1. It may 
be that the presence of such legislation would justify a decision similar to that in Wray v. 
Wray since the latent ambiguity in the deed could be cleared up without the need for 
parol evidence. The presence in the legislation relating to registered companies of the 
United Kingdom and various Dominions and Colonies of a provision limiting the size of 
unincorporated trading associations to not more than twenty members may also account 
for a readiness to uphold deeds of conveyance to a partnership in the firm name. E.g., 
Companies Act, 1948, 11 8: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§429, 434. 
20 Lloyd v. I.oaring, 6 Ves. Jr. 773, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1802). Some members of an 
association might sue as individuals on behalf of themselves and the remaining members 
to have goods and effects of the association delivered up to the association. Lavretta v. 
Holcombe, 98 Ala. 503, 12 S. 789 (1892). Where a sheriff was required to levy on the 
personal property of a judgment debtor, an unincorporated association could be heard by 
its president to make a claim of ownership to property in the judgment debtor's posses-
sion. Curtiss v. Hoyt, I9 Conn. 154, 48 Am. Dec. 149 (1848). An unincorporated fire 
company's sale of a building apart from the land on which it stood was not ineffective 
merely because of the lack of incorporation. 
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be transferred to an association eo nomine. In Missouri, although 
a deed of conveyance of land to an association has been regarded 
as a nullity, a transfer of shares to an association has been held to 
be effective.21 It was held that the title to the property vested in 
the members in their "joint associated capacity" but that the shares 
should for practical reasons be listed in the name of some officer 
or officers on trust for the membership. The court accordingly 
directed a transfer to persons to be designated by the members. A 
Massachusetts decision22 has held that share certificates in a trust 
set up to acquire land for the use of a club might be held in the 
name of the club and that the real owners of the shares were the 
club members who owned them jointly. 
Unless the court is prepared to engage in the administrative 
process of ensuring a residence for the legal title which will meet 
the practical difficulties, a disposition of registered securities inter 
vivos to an association would seem to have the vice of uncertainty 
which affects a deed of conveyance to an association. 
Leases to associations raise special probleµis because the con-
tinuing contract element in this type of interest-transferring trans-
action looms large. Though it may be possible to treat a grant of 
a freehold interest to an association as conferring an interest on 
individual members it is more difficult to accord the same treat-
ment to a lease to an association.23 In the grant of the freehold 
such a construction confers benefits which usually outweigh in 
value any liabilities which ownership may impose. But to regard 
a lease to an association as a lease to the individual members would 
impose what are usually onerous personal liabilities on them. It 
is for this reason that courts in the British Commonwealth have 
refused effect to a. lease given to an association eo nomine.24 The 
proper procedure is for the lease to be taken in the name of trustees 
for the association. The legal system can cope with a lease made 
to a partnership in the firm name in this way because each member 
of the partnership has power to pledge the personal credit of every 
member in transactions entered into by him for the purpose of the 
partnership business.26 But the mere fact of membership in a non-
21 Thadeus Kosciuszko Soc. v. Polish Home Assn., (Mo. App. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 811. 
22 Comstock v. Dewey, 323 Mass. 583, 83 N.E. (2d) 257 (1949). One of the authorities 
relied on was Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31, 2 N.E. 687 (1885), supra note 14. 
23 But see Sommers v. Reynolds, 103 Mich. 307, 61 N.W. 501 (1894); Edwards v. Old 
Settlers' Assn., (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 166 S.W. 423. 
24 Jarrott v. Ackerley, 113 L.T. 371, 85 L.J. Ch. 135 (1915); Henderson v. Toronto 
General Trusts Corp., 62 O.L.R. 303, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 411; Canada Morning News Co. v. 
Thompson, [1930] S.C.R. 338, [1930] 3 D.L.R. 833. 
25 Evans v. Curtis, 2 C. & P. 296, 172 Eng. Rep. 133 (1826). 
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profit association does not subject a member to personal liability. 
The general rule has been that a general authority given by the 
members to officers of the association to do all things necessary for 
the accomplishment of the objects of the association does not suffice 
to fix personal liability on the individual members as the result of 
a transaction entered into by those officers within the scope of that 
general authority. To make a member personally liable on a con-
tract ostensibly made for an association it is generally held neces-
sary to prove that he authorized the particular transaction in the 
course of which the contract was made, that he participated in the 
transaction or that he ratified the contract after it was made. If a 
lease to an association in the association name is regarded primarily 
as a contract, these principles are brought into play. Such a lease 
has been held to have effect in favor of the members who executed 
it and the members who authorized or ratified it even though it 
could not be sustained- as a conveyance to the unincorporated 
group.2a 
If the lessor is content to look to the property of the association 
for satisfaction of any claims which he may have arising from the 
lease, such a transaction entered into by the officers in the exercise 
of a general managerial authority might be upheld as conferring 
an interest on each of the individual members.27 
This examination of the attitude of the courts to dispositions 
inter vivos of various types of property suggests that apart from 
leases it is not the lack of legal personality on the part of the asso-
ciation which prevents such dispositions from always being effec-
tive but the absence of conveyancing techniques to meet the need 
for certainty of title. 
JJ. TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS OF INTERESTS TO AN 
AssocIATION Eo NOMINE 
In this section devises and bequests will be considered together 
since there has been much interplay between the cases on each. 
If the reason why an association cannot take as grantee under a 
deed of conveyance inter vivos is its lack of legal personality, the 
26 Reding v. Anderson, 72 Iowa 498, 34 N.W. 300 (1887); Krall v. Light, (Mo. App. 
1948) 210 S.W. (2d) 739. 
27 Lamm v. Stoen, 226 Iowa 622, 284 N.W. 465 (1939). The decision in this case 
upholding a lease to an association eo nomine by its president may be regarded as based 
on the reasoning in the text or on the ground that the lessor by having dealt with the 
association as a legal entity and having received valuable consideration from it was pre-
cluded from denying the validity of the lease on the ground that the association had no 
legal existence. 
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same reason should prevent it from taking under a devise to the 
association eo nomine. Many courts have refus(;!d to uphold devises 
of this kind for this reason.28 
Many courts have stated a general rule that a legacy or bequest 
to an association in the association name is ineffective for the same 
reason. A notable example is provided by the courts of New 
York.29 But there it was recognized that this principle is unneces-
sarily artificial and techniques have been developed to save dispo-
sitions to associations. These techniques30 are somewhat special and 
28Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44 (1864); White v. Howard, 46 N.Y. 144 (1871); Marx 
v. McGlynn, 88 N.Y. 357 (1882); Fisher v. Lister, 130 Misc. I, 223 N.Y.S. 321 (1927), mod. 
on other grounds 222 App. Div. 841, 226 N.Y.S. 484 (1928); Matter of Idem, 256 App. Div. 
124, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 970 (1939), affd. without opinion 280 N.Y. 756, 21 N.E. (2d) 522 (1939); 
In re Gault's Estate, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 928 (1944); In re Andrejevich's Estate, 57 N.Y.S. (2d) 
86 (1945); Society of the Most Precious Blood v. Moll, 51 Minn. 277, 53 N.W. 648 (1892). 
The opinion in this case does not make it clear whether the devise in question was void 
because the persons to take were uncertain or because an association can never take be-
cause it is not a legal person. Since the court cited German Land Assn. v. Scholler, 10 
Minn. 331 (1865), the latter reason could be regarded as controlling the decision. 
29 Owens v. Missionary Soc., 14 N.Y. 380 (1856); Sherwood v. American Bible Soc., I 
Keyes (N.Y.) 561 (1864); First Presbyterian Soc. v. Bowen, 21 Hun (N.Y.) 389 (1880); 
Matter of Grossman, 190 Misc. 521, 75 N.Y.S. (2d) 235 (1947). 
30 The salvaging techniques used in New York took the following forms: 
(a) Where the will gave the association an interest the enjoyment of which was 
postponed as, for example, when it was intended to take the property on the death of a 
life tenant, and the association became incorporated during the currency of the prior 
interest, the incorporated association could take the gift. Philson v. Moore, 23 Hun (N.Y.) 
152 (1880). In this case the court likened the disposition to a bequest to an unborn child. 
In 1952 the New York Decedent Estate Law was amended [Laws 1952, c. 832] to provide 
that where a testamentary disposition is made to an unincorporated association which is 
one authorized to become incorporated the disposition shall not be deemed invalid be-
cause of the association's lack of capacity if, within one year after probate of the will or 
within any period during which the vesting of the disposition is postponed, whichever 
period is greater, the association shall become incorporated. Provision is made for the 
vesting of the disposition in trustees in the meantime. 
(b) In many cases of wills making gifts to unincorporated groups, the testator has 
been taken to have intended to make a gift to an entity capable of receiving and his 
designation of an unincorporated association has been regarded as a use of loose language 
to which the court was free to fix a meaning which would effectuate his presumed inten-
tion. Thus a bequest to the "Home Missionary Society," an unincorporated body, was 
saved by finding that the testator really intended to benefit the "Presbyterian Committee 
of Home Missions," an incorporated body. Leonard v. Davenport, 58 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 384 
(1877). 
(c) Another method, described as the "parent and branch" approach, has been avail-
able whenever the unincorporated body designated by the testator is a department or 
branch of some incorporated body. In this situation the gift is held to be one which could 
be taken by the incorporated body. 
(d) A fourth method saved some testamentary dispositions to charitable associations. 
Between 1788 and 1893 the law of New York did not cater specially for charitable trusts, 
the New York Legislature having repealed the English statute 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 [Laws 1788, 
c. 46, §37]. In 1893 the New York Legislature restored the law of charitable trusts by an 
act commonly called the "Tilden Act" [Laws 1893, c. 701] after the failure of Governor 
Tilden's attempt to set up a substantial charitable trust [5 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1892)]. The 
Act of 1893, the substance of which is now in New York Real Property Law §113 (1) and 
New York Personal Property Law §12 (1), was designed to effectuate dispositions to re-
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it is not proposed to examine them in detail. Other methods which 
have appealed to a wide variety of jurisdictions will be considered 
in the following treatment. 
A. Construction of Disposition as One to the Existing Members 
One way in which a disposition by will to an association might 
be sustained is to hold that it is a gift to the individual members 
at the time the will operates. So far as dispositions of land are 
concerned it has been put above that the reason for the ineffec-
tiveness of a transaction inter vivos lies not in the absence of 
incorporation but in the technique of conveyancing applicable to 
such transactions. 
When the disposition is by devise other considerations may 
govern so as to permit the disposition to be treated as one to a 
group of individual devisees. In the transaction inter vivos the 
aim is to have the interest pass by virtue of the deed of convey-
ance aided only by information readily available in public rec-
ords, such as registers of corporations and companies, births, deaths, 
proved wills, etc. The desire for smooth transfer of the title and 
the exigencies of commerce will not admit of anything in the 
nature of an administrative inquiry as to what individuals might 
be comprehended by the association name set forth in the deed 
as the description of the grantee. But in testamentary succession 
there is always an administrative process and if courts were con-
cerned to uphold a devise to an association as a devise to the indi-
vidual members, they could use this process to ascertain the indi-
vidual devisees thus satisfying the demand for certainty in land 
titles. 
Where the testamentary disposition is one of money or chattels 
the conveyancing difficulties attendant on transactions with land 
ligious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses. Before this act a disposition to a 
charitable association was in no better position than one to a non-charitable association. 
After the act came into effect, it came to be regarded as warranting a decision that a gift 
to an association existing for any of the purposes described in the act, even though in 
form direct, could take effect as a trust for those purposes and that the court could appoint 
a capable person to take as trustee. In 1953 the New York Real Property Law §113 and 
the New York Personal Property Law §12 were amended by adding provisions expressly 
sanctioning this form of judicial power to save gifts to associations which were for reli-
gious, educational, charitable or benevolent purposes. The legislation allows the power to 
be exercised in relation to dispositions inter vivos as well as gifts by will [Laws 1953, c. 
715]. 
These various salvaging methods are described in greater detail in the Report of the 
Laws Revision Commission of the State of New York, Legislative Document No. 65 CT) 
(1951). 
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would not be a reason for rejecting this method of saving a legacy 
or bequest to an association in the group name. 
The reactions of courts to arguments that testamentary dispo-
sitions to associations may be upheld in this way will now be ex-
amined. · Ireland provides a number of illustrations. The argu-
ment was put in Hogan v. Byrne31 where the testator gave his 
"house and garden, out-office, lawn, to monks named 'Christian 
Brothers', and £, 100, in order to pay their rent." The court found 
that there were in England and Ireland forty-two establishments 
of Christian Brothers and that in each there were three to seven 
members. The prospect that, if this argument were acceded to, 
the one piece of land would vest in about two ht,mdred persons 
was enough to make the Court of Common Pleas find that the 
testator coulcl not have intended to benefit any individual mem-
bers and that he intended to benefit the group enterprise as a 
continuing entity. The order not being incorporated and the 
court not having jurisdiction over charitable trusts, the disposi-
tion had to be held ineffective. If any possibility existed of its 
being upheld as a charitable trust, that was a matter for the Court 
of Chancery. 
Stewart v. Green,32 though concerned not with a direct devise 
to an association but a trust for the "Community of the Sisters 
of the Order of Mercy" resident in Ballinasloe, evoked statements 
from Christian, L.J., which favored this argument. His statements 
are dicta only because counsel for the Superioress of the Com-
munity disclaimed the argument. Christian, L.J., recognized that 
construction of the disposition as one in favor of the members of 
the community at the testator's death would be in disregard of 
the testator's intended purpose. But since his real intent to bene-
fit the group enterprise as a continuing entity could not be given 
legal effect, the court was free to salvage the disposition as far as 
it could by treating it as a gift to individuals. There was some 
authority for so treating a bequest of this kind in Hertrion v. 
Bonham,33 a decision of Sir Edward Sugden in 1844. 
Shortly after, in England, Sir John Wicke:J;].s, V.C., in Cocks 
v. Manners34 held that a disposition by will directly to "the Do-
minican Convent at Carisbrooke," a non-charitable association, 
was good as a gift to the individual members as at the time the 
31 13 Ir. C.L.R. 166 (1862). 
32 5 Ir. R. Eq. 470 (1870). . 
33 Reported in O'LEARY, CHARITABLE UsES, 1st ed., 89 (1847). 
34 L.R. 12 Eq. 574 (1871). 
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will operated. Then in Ireland, in Re Delany's Estate35 a devise 
of freeholds to a trustee in trust for "the Sisters of Mercy at Bantry" 
was held to be effective to create a trust in favor of those indi-
viduals who were members at the testator's death and who num-
bered not more than twelve thus being a class easy of ascertain-
ment.36 In another Irish case arising a year later, Morrow v. 
McConville,81 a testator had bequeathed a 999 years leasehold to 
his wife for her life and had directed that after her death, his 
trustees should sub-let and from the rents apply moieties to the 
use of several named beneficiaries including one moiety "to be 
applied to the use and benefit of the Roman Catholic convent of 
St. Joseph's, Lurgan." After reviewing all the earlier c~es, Chat-
terton, V.C., held that this was a non-charitable gift and, distin-
guishing Re Delany's Estate, that it could not be regarded as a 
gift to individuals. As to Christian, L.J.'s, suggestion in Stewart 
v. Green that the gift there might have been upheld as a gift to 
individuals, Chatterton, V.C., was impressed with the difficulty 
that such a construction would give the members· interests as joint 
tenants which would be capable of severance and which each 
could assign or continue to enjoy even in the event of leaving the 
community. It may be that in 1883 the incidents of membership 
of an association in relation to the enjoyment of the association 
property were not as fully worked out as they are today. As has 
been put earlier,88 those incidents arise either from the contract 
of association or from equities created by the fact of association 
and they imply that legal controls would prevent the result he 
feared. The difficulty felt by Chatterton, V.C., had been adverted 
to by Christian, L.J., in Stewart v. Green but he had sufficient 
faith in the sincerity of the individual members to believe that 
in practice they would all apply what they received to the pur-
poses of the community.39 Because of his view of what would 
happen if the gift were held to benefit the members individually, 
~hatterton, V.C., could not see the salvage function of the con-
struction he opposed and his judgment condemns it roundly as 
35 L.R. 9 Ir. R. 226 (1882). 
86 Lord Chancellor Law was apparently prepared to find that the community had 
charitable objects but he thought it was not necessary to base his decision on this ground. 
It would seem that if there is any possibility of the association being charitable, that 
possibility should be excluded before the "gift to individual members" construction is 
arrived at. 
37 L.R. 11 Ir. R. 236 (1883): 
as Pages 78-75 supra. · 
39 This belief may have been inspired by the religious character of the association in 
question. 
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being directly inconsistent with the testator's intention. He also 
took a view of the effect of Cocks v. Manners different from that 
in earlier judgments in that he denied that it decided that the 
members of the Dominican Convent were held to take as indi-
viduals. He appears to have viewed Cocks v. Manners as a deci-
sion that the gift was one to the Dominican Convent as a unit 
because Wickens, V.C., implied that no disposition of the prop-
erty could be made unless all the members of the convent agreed. 
Viewed in that light, Cocks v. Manners could not be followed in 
Ireland since Hogan v. Byrne and Stewart v. Green denied quasip 
corporate character to the communities of the kind in question. 
This rebuff to the "gift-to-existing-members" construction 
proved to be only temporary for in later cases in Ireland the argu-
ment has been accepted. In Re Wilkinson's Trusts4° the disposi-
tion was a bequest of £1,000 to S, "Superioress of the Convent 
of Mercy at K., to and for the purposes solely of the said convent 
at my decease." The decision of the court of appeal was that 
whether or not this was a charitable bequest, it was valid since 
it was a trust for the existing members of the convent. This is a 
particularly strong authority because the testator's words show 
clearly that he was concerned to benefit the group enterprise 
rather than a particular class of individuals. Later Irish cases 
adopt the same approach.41 
Meanwhile in England the same argument supported by Cocks 
v. Manners was put in a number of cases with varying success. In 
Re Dutton,42 the testator directed his executors to invest the pro-
ceeds of conversion of his property and to pay the income there-
from to his wife for her life and after her death the capital was 
to be paid "unto the trustees for the time being of the Tunstall 
Athenaeum Mechanics Institution, to be applied by them towards 
the building fund in connection therewith." The argument that 
this was a gift to the individual members and not to the group 
enterprise had to meet the circumstance that under the Literary 
40 19 L.R. Ir. 531 (1887). 
41 Bradshaw v. Jackman, 21 L.R. Ir. 12 (1887). Bequest to M., Superioress of the St. 
Anne's Convent. of Mercy in trust for the community of the said convent .•• , Bequest to 
the Marist Sisters of the Convent of C.; Bequest to G., Superioress of the Convent of D., 
in trust for the support of the said D., Convent. All bequests upheld as being for the 
benefit of individual members. Re Byrne, [1935] Ir. R. 782, 70 Ir. L.T.R. 122. Trust to 
pay proceeds of conversion "for the absolute use and benefit of the Jesuit Order in Ire-
land:" Upheld by Supreme Court of Ireland with one dissentient is a valid non-charitable 
gift for the benefit of the class comprising the individual members of the Irish Province 
of the Jesuit .Order. • 
42 4 Ex. D. (1878). 
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and Scientific Institutions Act, 1854,43 the members by voting to 
dissolve the association would not thereupon become entitled 
to divide the association's assets between themselves since the act 
provided that such assets should on dissolution go to some other 
institution ascertained in accordance with the act's provisions. In 
the opinion of the court, this circumstance made Cocks v. Man-
ners distinguishable. Accordingly the court, applying the rule 
then regarded as applicable to associations to determine whether 
gifts of this kind were void as tending to a perpetuity, said that 
as the members could not on dissolution divide the assets between 
them, the gift tended to a perpetuity and was void. 
Re A mos44 is a case with some of the features of the Irish cases 
of Morrow v. McConville and Hogan v. Byrne. The testamentary 
dispositions were of a leasehold property and two freehold prop-
erties to the Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders Society in 
remainder after life interests in favor of named individuals. North, 
J., like Chatterton, V.C., in Morrow v. McConville, thought that 
construction of each gift as one to individuals would enable any 
member to commence an action for partition or sale and to take 
the control of the property away from the association. This reason 
for rejecting the construction is no longer valid. A more sub-
stantial reason would have been that the property being land and 
the membership of the association being large the construction 
would have led to an impracticable result just as it would have 
done in Hogan v. Byrne. Accordingly the dispositions had to be 
construed as being to the continuing group enterprise and as such 
they were held to be gifts tending to a perpetuity and therefore 
void. The perpetuity angle of this case will be considered later. 
An alternative ground for holding the dispositions void was that 
under the Trade Union Act, 1871,45 a trade union was not author-
ized to acquire and hold land otherwise than by "purchase." The 
word "purchase" as used in the act was interpreted in something 
approaching its popular sense rather than the technical sense of 
taking otherwise than by descent or escheat and thus the trade 
union in this case could not acquire the properties in question. 
Assuming that the "gift-to-existing-members" construction would 
have been open to the court in this case it is doubtful whether 
the decision on this alternative ground would have been any differ-
43 17 &: 18 VicL, c. 112, §30. 
44 [1891] 3 Ch. 159. 
45 34 &: 35 Viet., c. 31, §7. 
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ent. The members would have taken not in their individual 
capacities but as associates and subject to the incidents of owner-
ship by associates. Their collective taking as associates would have 
constituted acquisition by an unincorporated trade union rather 
than as non-associated individuals and the restriction in the act 
would still have been relevant. 
In Re Clarke,46 Byrne, J., upheld a bequest "to the committee 
for the time being of the Corps of Commissionaires in London 
to aid in the purchase of their barracks, or in any other way bene-
ficial to that corps." In a passage which has been quoted in many 
later judgments Byrne, J., said, 
"It is, I ·think, established by the authorities that a gift 
to a perpetual institution not charitable is not necessarily bad. 
The test, or one test, appears to be, will the legacy when paid 
be subject to any trust which will prevent the existing mem-
bers of the association spending it as they please? If not, the 
gift is good. So also if the gift. is to be construed as a gift to 
or for the benefit of the individual members of the associa-
tion. On the other hand, if it appears that the legacy is one 
which by the terms of the gift, or which by reason of the 
constitution of the association in whose favour it is made, 
tends to a perpetuity, the gift is bad.''47 
This passage is not free from ambiguity in the light of the rest of 
the judgment. Byrne, J., followed Cocks v. Manners,48 Re Wil-
kinson's Trusts49 and Bradshaw v. ]ackman50 and by so doing he 
would seem to indicate that he construed the bequest as one to 
the individual members. The passage quoted, however, is capable 
of suggesting that valid dispositions to associations are not limited 
to gifts to individuals but may be in the form of trusts provided 
the existing members are free to spend the subject-matter of the 
trust. The kind of trust contemplated by the passage is not clear. 
He may have been referring to a trust for the ·members as con-
trasted with a gift directly to the members or he may have been 
referring to a trust not for any individuals but for the purposes 
of the association. In some later cases51 the latter has been taken 
to be his meaning with the result that dispositions to associations 
with non-charitable objects have been drawn into the controversy 
46 [1901] 2 Ch. 110. · 
47 Id. at 114. 
48 L.R. 12 Eq. 574 (1871), note 34 supra. 
<i9 19 L.R. Ir. 531 (1887), note 40 supra. 
r,o 21 L.R. Ir. 12 (1887), note 41 supra. 
51 E.g., Re Drummond, [1914] 2 Ch. 90; Re Price, [1943] Ch. 422. 
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as to whether a trust for a non-charitable purpose is valid. The 
position of dispositions to non-charitable associations in relation 
to that controversy will be considered in detail later. At this 
stage, the only point intended to be made is that Re Clarke kept 
alive the salvage construction typified by Cocks v. Manners. 
A further instance of the notion that a disposition to a non-
charitable association is to be construed as a gift to the individual 
members is provided by Re Smith52 in which a trust "for the 
society or institution known as the Franciscan Friars of Clevedon 
in the county of Somerset absolutely" was upheld on this basis. In 
reaching this result, reliance was placed on the cases in which dis-
positions to partnerships in the firm name had been upheld as 
dispositions to the individual partners.53 Joyce, J., has said: 
"So in my opinion a bequest to any unincorporated so-
ciety or association not charitable is good because, and only 
because, it is treated as being and is a bequest to the several 
members of such society or association, who can spend the 
money as they please. If there should be any understanding, 
or even contract, between these persons as to how the moneys 
so derived, that is from legacies, are to be expended, that is 
something with which in the absence of an express trust or 
direction in the will the executors who pay the legacy have 
nothing whatever to do.''54 
Then in Bourne v. Keane55 a legacy of £200 to the "Jesuit 
Fathers in Farm Street" was sustained on this ground, Lord Buck-
master56 and Lord Parmoor57 expressly approving Cocks v. Man-
ners and Re Smith. 
This way of viewing a disposition to a non-charitable associa-
tion eo nomine has also been adopted in a number of other juris-
dictions of the British Commonwealth.58 
52 [1914] l Ch. 937. 
53 E.g., Wray v. Wray, [1905] 2 Ch. 349, note 19 supra. 
54 [1914] 1 Ch. 937 at 948. 
55 [1919] A.C. 815. 
56 Id. at 874. 
57 Id. at 916. 
58 Walker v. Murray, 5 O.R. 638 (1884) (bequest to "the Sisters of Charity at Hamilton 
••• to be their property absolutely" considered capable of being upheld as a gift to the 
individual members of the order); Re McAuliffe, [1944] Queensland St. R. 167 (whole 
estate devised and bequeathed upon trust for conversion and proceeds to be held "upon 
trust for the T.B. Sailors' and Soldiers' Association of Queensland ••• absolutely for such 
purposes as the Board or Committee of Management of the said Association shall in its 
unfettered discretion and in accordance with its Rules at any time and from time to time 
decide." This was held to be a gift to the members of the association); Re Cain, [1950] 
Viet. L.R. 382, [1950] Arg. L.R. 796; Re Lester, [1940] Northern Ir. 92 (legacy and bequest 
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It will be apparent that the Irish and British courts, while 
able to treat bequests and legacies as gifts to individuals, have had 
difficulty in dealing similarly with devises. They have not, how-
ever, summarily rejected the possibility that a devise might be 
so dealt with. If the group is not so large that a holding that the 
members take as co-owners would lead to impracticable results, 
the devise may be given effect in this way. 
While some American courts have been prepared to allow 
that a bequest to an association may be upheld as a gift to the 
individual members59 there have been indications that a devise 
could not be so treated. A reason for this has been stated in the 
opinion of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in Hadden v. 
Dandy60 as follows: 
"It seems to be well settled by what I conceive to be the 
weight of authority, and in accord with reason, that a volun-
tary unincorporated association may be a legatee of a legacy 
like this. It is to be observed, first, that there is here no de-
vise · of real estate requiring a person, natural or artificial, 
capable of holding the title; and, second, that there is no 
' perpetual continuing trust, which can be administered only 
by such a person. The gift is of money and is absolute and 
unlimited by any trust except such as is implied by its being 
given to a religious society. . . . In order to carry out the 
intention of the testator, we have only to see to it that the 
gift reaches the proper officer of the association. What shall 
afterwards become of it does not concern the court, as, so 
far as appears, it did not the testator. He app~ars to have 
been satisfied to give the money to the association without 
any direction as to how it was to be used, relying, as he might 
well do, upon the general and established character of the 
society."61 
This passage indicates that the reason why there should be doubt 
of share of residue to "the Theosophical Society of Belfast" held ·to be valid gifts to the 
several persons who were members of the lodges in Belfast at the time of the testatrix's 
death). 
59 Guild v. Allen, 28 R.I. 430, 67 A. ,855 (1907) (bequest of $1,000 "to the Home 
Missionary Society of the First Baptist Church of Providence, R.I.'' held to be a gift to 
the individual members calling themselves by that name); Hartman v. Pendleton, 96 Ore. 
503, 186 P. 572, mod in other respects 96 Ore. 503, 190 P. 339 (1920); American Tract 
Society v. Atwater, 30 Ohio St. 77 (1876); Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44 (1864). 
60 51 N.J. Eq. 154, 26 A. 464, affd. 51 N.J. Eq. 330, 30 A. 429 (1893). The bequest 
upheld here was to the Wesleyan Methodist Society of Ireland. The decision was reached 
without any statement that the court was applying the law of Ireland. 
6151 N.J. Eq. 154 at 158-159. 
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about dispositions to associations is not their lack of legal person-
ality but the inability of the law to provide a technique for col-
lective ownership of certain types of property in the absence of 
incorporation or trust. In some jurisdictions, however, in which 
bequests but not devises are held effective, courts find it necessary 
to say that although an association is not a legal person, it has a 
quasi-corporate existence in law, as a justification for holding that 
the bequest is effective.62 Sometimes the attribution of a quasi-
corporate status is supported by reference to legislation, which 
exists in many American states, permitting associations to sue and 
be sued in the association name and other changes in the law 
which may give associations some powers usually possessed by cor-
porations.68 In this context it is doubtful if the epithet "quasi-
corporate" really serves any purpose beyond emboldening the 
court to escape the doubtful dogma that an association not incor-
porated has no capacity to take a gift. Whether the association is 
described as quasi-corporate or not the question of where the title 
to the property resides still has to be faced. In these cases concern-
ing bequests the subject matter of the gift is held to vest in the 
individual members. What really allows the courts to give effect 
to many bequests is the comparative informality with which title 
to money or goods may be handled. In those American jurisdic-
tions in which deeds of conveyance to associations are upheld it 
would seem that the courts should be prepared to go as far as the 
Irish and British courts and give effect to devises as well as be-
quests. 64 
Under this salvage construction the title to the property given 
vests in those persons who are members of the association but 
under the rules developed independently in cases concerned with 
the administration of the property of associations, those members 
cannot deal with the property in the manner open to non-associated 
joint tenants or tenants in common.611 They hold the title subject 
to an obligation to permit the proper~y to be used for the objects 
of the association in the manner prescribed by the constitution 
and by-laws of the association. The practical effect of the two cur-
rents of authority, one upholding dispositions to associations as 
62 E.g., Houk's Estate, 33 Pa. D. &: C. 511 _(1938). 
63 E.g., Re Spotz's Estate, 51 Pa. D. &: C. 427 (1944). 
64 Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31, 2 N.E. 687 (1885); Popovich v. Yugoslav National 
Home Soc., 106 Ind. App. 195, 18 N.E. (2d) 948 (1939); Pushor v. Hilton, 123 Me. 225 at 
228, 122 A. 673 (1923). 
611 Pages 73-75 supra. 
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class dispositions and the other limiting the interest which the 
recipients of the title obtain, is to enable what could be a perpetual 
succession. As old members leave the group and new members 
join, according to the -second line of authority, interests in the 
association property would be constantly changing. Insofar as 
that association property is made up of money and chattels, the 
changes of membership would be reflected in changes of residence 
of the legal title but insofar as that property includes realty, con-
veyancing difficulties would very soon be encountered even in the 
smallest association and unnecessary expense would be incurred 
in ensuring that the residence of the legal title substantially coin-
cided with the state of membership of the associ~tion. 
Leaving aside these difficulties, the result of this construction 
is that a benefactor of an association has his intention carried out. 
The person who gives property to an association is not con-
cerned to benefit merely the individual members at the time his 
gift takes effect. He is concerned in most cases to advance the pur-
pose for which the association exists irrespective of who may be 
the members for the time being. If he uses words of disposition 
which are amenable to an interpretation that he could conceivably 
have wanted to benefit the individuals who are members at the 
time the gift operates, the law, under pretense of giving effect to 
this imputed intention, really gives effect to his r~al intent by 
bringing the rules on the nature of a member's interest into play. 
But if he should make his real intention so clear that his words 
of disposition cannot possibly be read as meaning anything other 
than that he intended to benefit a continuing group enterprise, 
his intention may be frustrated. 
When the disposition is construed as a gift to the existing mem-
bers all problems which might be raised by the law. relating to 
perpetuities are avoided. The members are thought to take imme-
diate interests which are vested in accordance with the rule against 
remoteness of yesting and there is no suggestion of any indestruc-
tible trust. 
[ To be concluded. ] 
